A Father’s Fight to Have His Daughter Heard

A Narrative Story of In re the Marriage of Parslow, C0-99-1002 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999)

Christopher Parslow* felt his world shift when his 14-year-old daughter C.P. came to him with tears in her eyes and marks on her arms. It was December 3rd, 1998, and what she told him would change everything about their family’s custody arrangement forever.

C.P. had always been a spirited child, full of energy and strong opinions. At 14, she was navigating the typical challenges of adolescence while also managing the complexities of living between two homes. Christopher and his ex-wife Angi shared joint legal and physical custody of their children, with a unique four-day rotation schedule that accommodated Christopher’s demanding work schedule. The arrangement had worked reasonably well for years, but Christopher had been growing increasingly concerned about what was happening during C.P.’s time with her mother.

The events of early December shattered any remaining faith Christopher had in the current custody arrangement. On December 2nd, Angi had grabbed C.P. by the arms and slapped her during a fight with her older sister. But what happened the next morning was even more troubling. Angi had been so enraged about C.P. fighting with her younger sister that she woke her sleeping daughter in the early morning hours and hit her in the face.

When C.P. told her father what had happened, Christopher saw the fear in his daughter’s eyes. This wasn’t just typical parental discipline – this was something that had crossed a line. C.P. confided that her mother had told her “if she wanted to fight, she would have to fight with her.” The words chilled Christopher to the bone.

Without hesitation, Christopher took immediate action to protect his daughter. He reported the incidents to Hubbard County Social Services and attained full custody of C.P. The child protective specialist who investigated confirmed that Angi had indeed struck C.P., though they didn’t recommend ongoing child protective services since C.P. was now safely living with her father.

For Christopher, this validation from social services was both a relief and a source of deep concern. If the situation had been serious enough for social services to confirm the abuse, how could he ever feel comfortable sending C.P. back to her mother’s home? The specialist had noted that their decision not to pursue further action was based specifically on the fact that C.P. was now living with her father – implying that the situation might be different if she returned to her mother’s care.

As the weeks passed, Christopher watched his daughter begin to heal from the trauma. C.P. was clear about her feelings – she wanted to stay with her father full-time. She was afraid that her mother might hit her again, and she simply wasn’t “getting along” with Angi anymore. At 14, C.P. was old enough to understand her own needs and articulate her preferences clearly.

Christopher had always been a devoted father, but his work schedule had previously made full-time custody challenging. However, he had recently secured a new work arrangement that would allow him to care for C.P. on a full-time basis, with occasional help from his parents when needed. He was ready and willing to restructure his entire life to provide his daughter with the safe, stable environment she needed.

In February 1999, Christopher filed a motion seeking full physical custody of C.P. He requested an evidentiary hearing, knowing that the court needed to hear the full story of what had happened and understand the impact on his daughter. He submitted C.P.’s own affidavit, in which she clearly stated her preference to live with her father and expressed her fear about returning to her mother’s home.

Christopher was devastated when the district court denied his request for an evidentiary hearing. The judge seemed to dismiss the significance of what had happened, characterizing the physical abuse as an “isolated incident” that didn’t warrant custody modification. The court also suggested that C.P., at 13½ years old, was not mature enough for her preferences to be given serious consideration.

This decision felt like a betrayal of everything Christopher believed about protecting children. How could the court dismiss his daughter’s clearly expressed fears and preferences? How could they minimize the seriousness of a mother waking her sleeping child to hit her in the face? Christopher knew that C.P. was intelligent, articulate, and mature enough to understand her own needs. At 14, she deserved to have her voice heard.

The denial of the evidentiary hearing felt like the system was failing his daughter when she needed protection most. Christopher had done everything right – he had immediately removed C.P. from danger, reported the abuse to authorities, and sought legal remedies through proper channels. Yet the court seemed more concerned with maintaining the status quo than with ensuring C.P.’s safety and well-being.

Christopher refused to give up. He knew that his daughter’s safety and emotional well-being were at stake, and he was determined to fight for her right to live in a home where she felt safe and valued. He decided to appeal the district court’s decision, hoping that a higher court would recognize what seemed so obvious to him – that C.P. deserved to have her voice heard and her safety protected.

The appeal process was emotionally draining, but Christopher drew strength from C.P.’s resilience and her continued clear preference to remain in his care. She was thriving in his home, free from the fear and conflict that had characterized her relationship with her mother. Christopher could see his daughter’s confidence returning as she settled into a more stable routine.

When the Minnesota Court of Appeals issued its decision, Christopher felt a profound sense of validation and relief. The appellate court recognized what the district court had missed – that C.P., at 14 years old, was indeed mature enough for her preferences to be given significant consideration. The court acknowledged that while she might not be an “older teenager” whose preferences deserved “overwhelming consideration,” she certainly had “sufficient age and maturity to express a custodial preference.”

More importantly, the Court of Appeals understood the seriousness of what had happened to C.P. The court distinguished this case from situations involving single incidents of provoked physical discipline, noting that this involved two separate incidents within 24 hours, including the particularly troubling circumstance of Angi waking her sleeping daughter to hit her in the face.

The appellate court recognized that the desire for custody stability must be balanced against the need for a safe environment. They understood that C.P.’s fear of returning to her mother’s home, combined with her clear preference to live with her father, created a situation that warranted a full evidentiary hearing.

The court’s decision to reverse the district court’s denial and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing represented a victory not just for Christopher, but for C.P.’s right to be heard and protected. The Court of Appeals had recognized that there was “sufficient evidence in the record to justify an evidentiary hearing” and that C.P.’s safety and preferences deserved serious consideration.

For Christopher, this legal victory represented something much deeper than winning a court case. It was validation that his instincts as a father had been correct – that protecting his daughter from further harm was not only his right but his responsibility. The court had recognized that C.P.’s voice mattered, that her fears were legitimate, and that her safety was paramount.

The remand for an evidentiary hearing gave Christopher hope that the full story would finally be told. C.P. would have the opportunity to speak for herself, and the court would have the chance to fully understand the impact of the abuse on his daughter’s emotional well-being. Christopher felt confident that once all the evidence was presented, the court would recognize that C.P. belonged in a home where she felt safe, valued, and heard.

Most importantly, Christopher knew that he had stood up for his daughter when it mattered most. He had refused to let the system dismiss her fears or minimize her trauma. The Court of Appeals’ decision affirmed that fathers have not only the right but the obligation to protect their children from harm, and that children’s voices deserve to be heard in decisions that affect their lives.

C.P. could move forward knowing that her father had fought for her, that the legal system had ultimately recognized her right to safety and self-determination, and that her preferences and well-being were valued and protected. The victory represented hope for a future where she could thrive in an environment free from fear and conflict.

*This story is based on the true facts of the appellate court’s decision, but the personal experiences and emotions described are a fictional representation to bring the case to life.

Question: At What Age Can a Child Decide Where to Live?

Answer: Under Minnesota law, there is no single age at which a child can unilaterally decide where they will live or which parent they will stay with. Instead, a child’s custodial preference is one of the “best interests” factors a court considers when deciding custody or parenting time.

The governing statute, Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(3), provides that the court must evaluate “the reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of sufficient ability, age, and maturity to express an independent, reliable preference.” That preference must be both reasonable and independent—not the product of undue influence or manipulation.

Question: At what age can a child choose which parent to live with? 

Answer: There’s no specific age when a child can automatically decide where to live. Instead, courts consider the child’s opinion as one factor when deciding what’s best for the child.

Under Minnesota law, there is no single age at which a child can unilaterally decide where they will live or which parent they will stay with. Instead, a child’s custodial preference is one of the “best interests” factors a court considers when deciding custody or parenting time.

What does Minnesota law say about considering a child’s preference in custody cases?

Courts must consider what a child wants if the child is old enough and mature enough to give a reliable opinion that isn’t influenced by others. The preference must be reasonable and the child’s own decision.

The governing statute, Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(3), provides that the court must evaluate “the reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of sufficient ability, age, and maturity to express an independent, reliable preference.” That preference must be both reasonable and independent—not the product of undue influence or manipulation.

How much do courts consider what children of different ages want in custody cases?

The older the child, the more weight Minnesota courts give to their opinion. Very young children’s preferences usually don’t count, while teenagers’ preferences are taken very seriously.

The age of the child matters greatly, as seen here:

Can children under 6 years old have a say in custody decisions?

Children 6 and under are usually considered too young to have their preferences count, though some Minnesota courts have started considering what very mature 6-year-olds want.

Historically, Minnesota courts have held that children six and under are generally “too young to express a preference, regardless of asserted maturity levels.” (Sucher v. Sucher, 416 N.W.2d 182, 185 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), citing Speltz v. Speltz, 386 N.W.2d 264, 267 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)). However, in S.M.K. v. D.M.W., No. A14-1070, 2015 WL 853521 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2015), the court affirmed a district court’s consideration of a 6-year-old’s preference, showing that strict age cutoffs are no longer absolute.

Do courts listen to kids around 8 years old in custody cases?

Courts might consider what an 8-year-old wants if the child is very mature for their age.

Courts may consider a preference if the child is notably mature for their age. In Pekarek v. Pekarek, 384 N.W.2d 493, 498 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), the court noted that an evaluator considered the preference of an 8-year-old because of the child’s maturity.

How much do Minnesota courts consider what 10-12 year olds want in custody cases?

Courts give significant weight to what 10-12 year olds want, but they can still ignore the child’s preference if the child isn’t mature enough or if parents are influencing them.

Minnesota appellate decisions often give “significant weight” to the preference of a 10-year-old (Parslow v. Parslow, No. C0-99-1002, 1999 WL 1034210, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 1999)) and “great weight” to a preference expressed at 12½ (Steinke v. Steinke, 428 N.W.2d 579, 583–84 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988)). Still, the court can reject a stated preference if maturity is in doubt or the preference is influenced by conflict—e.g., Gregor v. Gregor, No. A14-1920, 2016 WL 456779, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2016) (11-year-old found not mature enough due to parental conflict).

Do teenagers get to decide where they live in custody cases?

Older teenagers’ preferences are usually the most important factor, and it’s hard to force a teenager to live somewhere they don’t want to be. However, Minnesota courts can still override a teen’s choice if it’s not good for them.

The preference of an older teenage child is often an “overwhelming consideration” (Ross v. Ross, 477 N.W.2d 753, 756 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991)), and courts have noted the practical difficulty of ordering a teenager to live where they do not wish (Geibe v. Geibe, 571 N.W.2d 774, 778 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997)). Nonetheless, the court can override a teen’s preference if it’s not in their best interests—see Modeo v. Price, No. A17-1460, 2018 WL 1787704, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2018) (15-year-old’s preference rejected due to mental health concerns and parental manipulation).

What happens if a parent influences what their child says they want in custody cases?

Minnesota courts won’t consider a child’s preference if a parent has manipulated or pressured the child into saying what they want.

A child’s preference will not carry weight if it is the result of manipulation or undue influence.

How can courts tell if a parent has influenced their child’s custody preference?

Courts look for signs like the child using adult language, expressing hatred toward one parent, or acting overly independent in ways that seem coached.

Signs of undue influence include “a campaign of hatred, parroting of adult language, and declarations of independence” (In re Weber, 653 N.W.2d 804, 810 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002)).

Can you give examples of when courts didn’t listen to children because of parental influence?

Courts have rejected children’s preferences when fathers manipulated teenage daughters or when mothers helped children write letters to the court and had fewer rules to make themselves look better.

Examples where courts rejected preferences due to manipulation: Hoffa v. Hoffa, 382 N.W.2d 522 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) – father’s manipulative conduct tainted adolescent daughters’ preference. Nelson v. Nelson, No. A06-558, 2006 WL 3007860, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2006) – children’s preference for mother rejected because it stemmed from fewer rules and written letters the mother helped them draft to the court.

What are the main things to remember about children’s preferences in custody cases?

There’s no automatic age when children get to decide, courts look at each case individually, older children’s opinions matter more, and preferences don’t count if parents have influenced the child.

The key Minnesota child input takeaways are

1. No automatic age – Even a 15- or 16-year-old’s preference can be disregarded if contrary to their best interests.
2. Case-by-case – The court evaluates maturity, independence, and reasonableness under Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(3).
3. Older children’s views carry more weight – Especially as they approach driving age (Ross, 477 N.W.2d at 756; Geibe, 571 N.W.2d at 778).
4. Undue influence negates weight – Preferences born from manipulation are not considered reliable (Weber, 653 N.W.2d at 810).