What Counts as ‘Appropriate Employment’ Under Minnesota Spousal Maintenance Law?

When a marriage ends, and one spouse has been the primary breadwinner while the other has focused on raising children or maintaining the household, the legal system is asked a hard question: What kind of job should the lower-earning spouse now be expected to take?

For many, the fear isn’t just about being alone—it’s about being forced into an unfamiliar world of work after years—or even decades—of absence. Minnesota law refers to this as “appropriate employment.” But what counts as appropriate? The answer, as the courts have shown over the years, depends on much more than whether someone is simply capable of working.

Nardini v. Nardini: Just because a spouse can work doesn’t mean any job is appropriate

For Sarah Nardini*, the concept of “appropriate employment” was not merely legal jargon; it was central to her sense of dignity and self-worth after a long marriage. Married for nearly 30 years, Sarah had supported her husband’s successful career, stepping back from the workforce herself. When divorce became inevitable, she grappled with a challenging question: was she obligated to take any job available, or did the law recognize the nuances of her age, lifestyle, and long absence from employment?

In Nardini v. Nardini, the Minnesota Supreme Court thoughtfully addressed Sarah’s situation, holding clearly that “the standard is not just whether the spouse is capable of self-support, but whether the spouse is capable of self-support at the standard of living established during the marriage.” (Nardini v. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d 184, 198 (Minn. 1987)). The Court emphasized that the law was not blind to the realities Sarah faced, acknowledging that after decades away from work, just any job was not necessarily suitable for her.

Flynn v. Flynn: Courts may consider income from employment, but cannot force a specific job

The experience of Rachel Flynn* echoed Sarah’s predicament. Rachel had been a dedicated homemaker, devoting years to raising children and managing the household. The divorce introduced a daunting reality—whether she had to quickly find a job and generate income or if the court would respect her historical role. In Flynn v. Flynn, the Minnesota Court of Appeals stated explicitly, “A spouse is not required to accept employment which is unsuitable considering the spouse’s education, training, and previous employment.” (Flynn v. Flynn, 402 N.W.2d 111, 114 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)). The court chose not to impute hypothetical income to Rachel, honoring her homemaker contributions during the marriage.

Maurer v. Maurer and Carrick v. Carrick: If the spouse was not employed—or only part-time employed—during the marriage, that status may continue post-divorce

As Minnesota courts continued exploring this sensitive area, returning to work after extended absences became increasingly complex. David Carrick* and Amy Maurer* each faced similar legal questions. Amy, minimally employed during marriage, feared compulsory full-time work post-divorce. David worried about penalties due to limited employment history. In Carrick v. Carrick, the court clearly articulated, “Absent evidence of bad faith underemployment, the obligor’s actual earnings should be considered presumptively appropriate.” (Carrick v. Carrick, 560 N.W.2d 407, 410 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997)). Similarly, in Maurer v. Maurer, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted, “The standard of living during the marriage and the recipient’s employment history during the marriage are highly relevant factors in determining what constitutes appropriate employment.” (Maurer v. Maurer, 623 N.W.2d 604, 608 (Minn. 2001)).

Rauenhorst v. Rauenhorst: There are limits to what counts as appropriate employment

Yet practical limits emerged, as demonstrated by Jenna Rauenhorst*. Jenna argued she was “appropriately employed” despite limited work during marriage due to her youth and employability. In Rauenhorst v. Rauenhorst, the court clarified explicitly, “While employment during the marriage is a significant factor, it is not an absolute limitation on imputing income when determining spousal maintenance.” (Rauenhorst v. Rauenhorst, 724 N.W.2d 541, 546 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006)). This ruling set necessary boundaries, preventing potential misuse of earlier protections.

What the Courts Are Really Asking

These cases collectively highlight a critical legal principle in Minnesota family law: Appropriate employment is carefully evaluated based on individual circumstances, considering factors like age, marital duration, standard of living, historical employment, and genuine capacity to work. Courts consistently balance fairness with practicality, honoring marital contributions and realistic post-divorce employability.

Each of these cases tells a different story, but they center on a shared legal and human question: What’s fair to expect from someone after divorce?

Under Minn. Stat. § 518.552, courts must assess whether a spouse can support themselves through “appropriate employment”. But what’s appropriate depends on many things—age, education, work history, health, the marriage’s duration, and the roles the spouses played.

• In Nardini, a theoretical ability to work didn’t eliminate the need for support.
• In Flynn, being a long-term homemaker didn’t trigger automatic income imputation.
• In Carrick and Maurer, past underemployment—if not done in bad faith—was not punished.
• And in Rauenhorst, courts reminded litigants that reasonable capacity to work can matter, too.

Together, these cases show that the law walks a delicate line. It doesn’t demand immediate reinvention. But it does expect spouses to do what they reasonably can. Courts look to the past—but not at the expense of a realistic future.